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ABSTRACT 
For decades, policymakers and program designers have gone on the assumption that large 
customers, particularly industrial facilities, are the best candidates for real-time pricing (RTP). 
This assumption is based partly on practical considerations (large customers can provide poten-
tially large load reductions) but also on the premise that businesses focused on production cost 
minimization are most likely to participate and respond to opportunities for bill savings. Yet few 
studies have examined the actual price response of large industrial and commercial customers in 
a disaggregated fashion, nor have factors such as the impacts of demand response (DR) enabling 
technologies, simultaneous emergency DR program participation and price response barriers 
been fully elucidated. 
This second-phase case study of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)’s large 
customer RTP tariff addresses these information needs. The results demonstrate the extreme di-
versity of large customers’ response to hourly varying prices. While two-thirds exhibit some 
price response, about 20% of customers provide 75-80% of the aggregate load reductions. Manu-
facturing customers are most price-responsive as a group, followed by government/education 
customers, while other sectors are largely unresponsive. However, individual customer response 
varies widely. Currently, enabling technologies do not appear to enhance hourly price response; 
customers report using them for other purposes. The New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO)’s emergency DR programs enhance price response, in part by signaling to customers 
that day-ahead prices are high. In sum, large customers do currently provide moderate price re-
sponse, but there is significant room for improvement through targeted programs that help cus-
tomers develop and implement automated load-response strategies. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the inception of real-time pricing (RTP) tariffs, policymakers and program design-
ers have assumed that large customers, particularly industrial facilities, are the best candidates 
for these tariffs. This assumption is based partly on practical considerations (large customers can 
provide potentially large load reductions) but also on the premise that businesses focused on pro-
duction cost minimization are most likely to participate and respond to opportunities for bill sav-
ings. Yet, although several studies have examined the actual price response of large industrial 
and commercial customers (Boisvert et al. 2003; Braithwait & O’Sheasy 2001; Goldman et al. 
2004a; Herriges et al. 1993; Schwarz et al. 2002; Zarnikau 1990), there have been limited at-
tempts to disaggregate results, and the impacts of such factors as demand response (DR) ena-
bling technologies, simultaneous emergency DR program participation and barriers to price re-
sponse have not been fully elucidated. Furthermore, previous studies examined response to RTP 
offered as optional service tariffs at vertically integrated utilities.1 In light of increasing interest 
by policymakers in default-service RTP in regions with organized wholesale markets and vary-
ing degrees of retail choice, disaggregated information on customer adaptation and response 
strategies, in such contexts, are needed to understand the DR potential of default-service pricing 
initiatives and to identify customer market segments that would most benefit from policies de-
signed to enhance their price response potential. 
We address these information needs with results from the second phase of a case study of 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)’s large customer RTP tariff, adopted as the de-
fault service for the “SC-3A” class of customers with peak demand greater than 2 megawatts 
(MW) in 1998. The 149 affected SC-3A customers range in peak demand from 2 MW to over 20 
MW and include manufacturers (32%), government/education facilities (30%), commercial and 
retail businesses (11%), and health care (11%) and public works (16%) facilities. 
The first phase of this research (Goldman et al. 2004b) examined SC-3A customers’ price 
response, aggregating results by three business sectors: industrial, commercial and govern-
ment/education. In addition, detailed customer surveys and interviews provided qualitative in-
formation on how these customers responded to default-service hourly day-ahead hourly pricing. 
The second phase of this study was undertaken to follow up on questions that remained unan-
swered (Goldman et al. 2005). It involved a second, shorter customer survey designed to obtain 
targeted information from a wider base of respondents; intensive follow-up with customers pro-
vided an excellent response rate of 57%. In addition, a more flexible demand model was used to 
estimate individual price elasticities for each customer, enabling a more disaggregated analysis 
of the results.2 In this phase, two additional years of hourly price and load data were available, 
expanding the study period to five summers (2000-2004). 
We begin this article with background on the RTP tariff and other options available to 
SC-3A customers during the study period, including other electric commodity supply options 
from NMPC and the competitive retail market, financial hedge products, DR-enabling technolo-
gies and emergency DR programs offered by the New York Independent System Operator (NY-
ISO). We also provide data on the uptake of these options. Next, we discuss how customers re-
spond, based on their survey responses, focusing on their load response strategies, the impact of 
enabling technologies and barriers they have encountered in responding to day-ahead hourly 
prices. Quantitative estimates of SC-3A customers’ price response are then discussed, demon-
strating the large variation in individual customer price response that underlies aggregate results. 
Based on model results and survey research, we discuss the primary factors driving SC-3A cus-
tomers’ price response: business sector, the influence of NYISO emergency DR programs, and 
the presence of price-response “champions”.  
    
Electricity Pricing, Products and Services 
 
SC-3A customers could choose from a variety of electricity supply options and related 
products and services during the study period (see Figure 1). These choices, their uptake by SC-
3A customers, and their potential impact on customers’ incentives to respond to high hourly 
prices are discussed below. 
                                                 
1 Goldman et al. (2004a) is the only study to examine large customer response to RTP in the context of re-
tail competition and organized wholesale markets.  
2 See Goldman et al. (2005) for more information on Phase 2 survey implementation and demand modeling 
techniques. 
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Electricity Supply Options 
 
All SC-3A customers pay common unbundled distribution rates, consisting of volumetric 
(per kWh) and demand (per kW) charges that collect capacity, delivery and other non-energy 
costs. For electric commodity service, NMPC customers could choose from several options dur-
ing the study period. 
  
NMPC Option 1—Day-Ahead Market Pricing. The default SC-3A commodity service, ini-
tially referred to as “Option 1”, applies to all customers that do not select another commodity 
supply option. It consists of hourly electricity prices derived by adding ancillary services and 
balancing charges to NYISO’s location-based day-ahead market prices.3 The next day’s prices 
are posted on the utility’s website by 4 p.m. each day. They are firm and applicable to all me-
tered electricity usage.  
In 2000, 60-65% of the 149 SC-3A customers purchased their electricity under the de-
fault rate. By the summer of 2004, only 36%, representing 34% of the class load, remained. 
Though many customers have migrated to competitive suppliers, customer acceptance of the de-
fault service tariff design is fairly high.4 We believe this is due to increasing numbers of com-
petitive suppliers offering alternatives, relatively low electricity price volatility in recent years, 
and the tariff’s day-ahead price notification, which provides time for customers to plan and exe-
cute their response. Some survey respondents indicated that they would be more likely to leave 
the utility if the default service were indexed to the real-time market, which affords no advance 
notice of prices, as has been done in New Jersey and Maryland. 
 
NMPC Option 2—Hedged Forward Contract. NMPC offered a hedged alternative, called 
“Option 2”, on a one-time basis just prior to the implementation of retail competition and de-
                                                 
3 All ancillary services are procured by NYISO, which collects the costs through uplift charges that are as-
sessed to load serving entities based on energy usage. 
4 Survey respondents, on average rated their satisfaction 2.8 out of 5 (5 indicating complete satisfaction). 
fault-service RTP in late 1998. Option 2 was a forward contract that offered a pre-determined 
time-of-use (TOU) rate schedule. Customers electing this option had to specify peak and off-
peak electricity quantities to which this pricing schedule would apply for each month of the five 
years covered by the contract, but they could nominate no usage in certain months or years if 
they wanted. The terms were somewhat restrictive; customers had to pay for all nominated load 
whether they used it or not. About 18% of SC-3A customers elected this option. Their average 
on-peak nomination turned out to cover about 60% of their actual peak-period usage. Option 2 
sunset in August 2003. 
 
Competitive Retail Market Alternatives. SC-3A customers have also had the option of pur-
chasing their commodity from competitive retailers since RTP became the default service in 
1998. In 2000, only 30% of customers had left NMPC for the competitive market. By 2004, 63% 
had switched. Much of this increase occurred in 2004 (the last year of the study). This coincides 
with the expiration of the Option 2 contracts and was also aided by the growth and maturation of 
the retail market in New York as well as in neighboring states that implemented retail choice and 
default-service RTP. 
Despite these overall trends, there is considerable diversity in SC-3A customers’ migra-
tion patterns over the study period. Customers may be categorized into four groups. First, a sub-
stantial number of customers never left the utility at all (28%). Of those that did, three-quarters 
did not return to NMPC once they had left (37% of SC-3A customers). Some (18%) moved back 
and forth between NMPC and the competitive market. Another group of customers (17%) had 
already left the utility by the summer of 2000 and never returned. 
Customers report that competitive suppliers offered two basic types of commodity pric-
ing during the study period: fixed and indexed. Fixed-rate tariffs reported by customers include 
TOU and flat-rate pricing, typically applying to all of the customer’s usage. These products re-
duce or eliminate the customer’s incentive to respond to hourly prices. However, affected cus-
tomers may still respond to other curtailment signals, such as NYISO emergency program 
events. 
The majority of survey respondents that switched reported taking indexed commodity 
products. Most were indexed to NMPC’s Option 1 tariff, but some customers reported products 
indexed directly to the NYISO day-ahead market or to some other reference prices. Reported in-
dexed products typically provided a discount relative to the default SC-3A rate (derived from a 
shopping credit built into the SC-3A service). 
Based on survey responses and tariff history information provided by Niagara Mohawk, 
we estimate that 7% to 25% of SC-3A customers took an indexed supply product in 2004. To-
gether with customers taking the default service (Option 1), we estimate that 45-60% of SC-3A 
customers were facing day-ahead, hourly prices in 2004. Clearly, default-service RTP can result 
in large numbers of customers facing hourly prices, even among those switching to competitive 
suppliers. 
 
Financial Hedge Products 
 
SC-3A customers could also purchase financial hedges through the retail market. Sepa-
rate from the supply of electricity, these products provide price risk protection, typically for a 
pre-specified volume of electricity, with the customer still exposed to hourly prices for marginal 
usage.5 Fewer than 10% of SC-3A customers appear to have purchased these products. In sur-
veys and interviews, most customers were either unclear what a financial hedge is or reported 
difficulties procuring them, largely due to restrictions or purchasing practices imposed by their 
organization.6  
 
Enabling Technologies 
 
One reason often offered for low price response is that customers lack the information 
and controls they need to effectively carry out a price response strategy. Many SC-3A customers 
had available, or installed during the study period, technologies with the potential to enhance 
their price response capability, in some cases funded by New York State Research and Devel-
opment Agency (NYSERDA) programs explicitly designed to encourage DR. The impact of 
these technologies on SC-3A customers’ price response is described below. 
 
NYISO Emergency DR programs 
 
Forty-two percent of SC-3A customers enrolled in one or both of NYISO’s two emer-
gency DR programs—the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) and the Installed Ca-
pacity/ Special Case Resource Program (ICAP/SCR)—for at least one summer between 2001 
and 2004.7 EDRP is a voluntary program that pays the higher of $500/MWh or the real-time lo-
cational energy market price for measured load reductions when NYISO calls emergency events. 
ICAP/SCR participants receive capacity payments and, since 2003, energy payments for load 
curtailed when NYISO declares emergency events. The ICAP/SCR program levies penalties for 
participants who fail to curtail when called upon. We discuss the contribution of these programs 
to SC-3A customers’ price response below. 
 
How Customers Respond 
 
Customers’ survey and interview responses provide important insights into how large 
customers currently adapt and respond to day-ahead market prices. We highlight the following 
results. 
 
Load Response Strategies 
 
We asked customers how they respond to high hourly prices, NYISO emergency events 
or public appeals to conserve. More than two-thirds reported some sort of response capability 
(see Figure 3). The most common strategy, reported by 45% of the 76 survey respondents, was 
foregoing discretionary load without making it up at another time. Twenty-two percent said they 
                                                 
5 The specific types of financial hedge products purchased by SC-3A customers are described in Goldman 
et al (2005). 
6 Some reported that different departments are responsible for purchasing energy and financial products, 
which complicates the decision. Others reported rules prohibiting them from purchasing financial derivatives alto-
gether. 
7 NYISO also offers an economic DR program—the Day-Ahead Demand Response Program (DADRP)—
in which only 3% of SC-3A customers enrolled. 
could shift load from one time period to another, and 16% reported serving load with onsite gen-
eration. Thirteen percent of survey respondents reported more than one load response strategy. 
 
Figure 3. Self-Reported Load Response Strategies 
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Customers within the same business sectors tended to report similar load response strate-
gies. Government/education customers were most likely to report foregoing load—almost all 
(83%) reported responding in this way. Survey results suggest that these customers are often 
willing to respond by curtailing lighting, HVAC or plug loads that often do not require resched-
uling. Manufacturing customers reported a wide variety of load response strategies, reflecting the 
diversity of customers included in this category. About one-third of manufacturing customers 
reported that they cannot respond at all.  
Load shifting was primarily reported by manufacturing customers, although several pub-
lic works facilities indicated that they can shift load (primarily water or wastewater treatment 
facilities that reschedule pumping). Onsite generation is reported as a load response strategy by 
half of healthcare customers; these facilities typically have backup generators installed for power 
reliability purposes. Commercial/retail customers were the least likely to report undertaking any 
response behavior. 
 
Impact of Enabling Technologies 
 
Many SC-3A customers have installed technologies and systems that have the potential to 
enhance price response. Among 76 survey respondents, 49% reported ownership of energy man-
agement control systems (EMCS) and/or peak load management (PLM) devices, 41% reported 
owning energy information systems (EIS) and 55% reported onsite generation. However, the ma-
jority indicated that they do not use these systems to respond to high hourly prices. Instead, 
EMCS/PLM and EIS devices are typically used for across-the-board energy savings (efficiency-
type improvements) or managing peak demand charges. Onsite generation is most often used for 
emergency backup or reliability reasons. At the same time, many customers reported specific 
load curtailment actions that are relatively “low-tech”, such as turning off lights, reducing air 
conditioning and office equipment usage, and asking employees to conserve. Some industrial 
customers reported shutting down plants or buildings or altering their production processes. We 
did find a correlation between the presence of onsite generation and highly responsive customers. 
Overall, though, we were unable to find a meaningful statistical relationship between ownership 
of these technologies and customers’ price response, although this is probably influenced by a 
small sample size (we only had sufficient information to perform this analysis on 55 customers). 
Although pilot studies have demonstrated the potential for semi- or fully automated DR through 
integrated energy management and information systems (Piette et al. 2005), most large custom-
ers currently do not have such practices in place, even though many have the needed equipment. 
As explanation, some customers told us the potential savings from responding to high hourly 
prices do not justify investing in strategies to respond. This ties in closely with customers’ re-
ported barriers to price response, which we discuss next. 
 
Barriers to Price Response 
 
Most survey respondents (88%) reported encountering at least one barrier to price re-
sponse (see Table 1). The most common obstacle, reported by half of respondents, was a lack of 
time or resources to monitor prices. Fully 70% said they rarely or never review the hourly prices 
posted by NMPC each day. For some, this precludes price response. Others appear to rely on co-
incident signals—NYISO emergency events or hot weather—to alert them of high prices. About 
a third of survey respondents reported encountering institutional barriers to price response. 
 
Table 1. Barriers to Price Response 
Barrier Percent of Respondentsa (N=76) 
ORGANIZATION/ BUSINESS PRACTICES 
   Insufficient time or resources to pay attention to hourly prices 51% 
   Institutional barriers in my organization make responding difficult 30% 
   Inflexible labor schedule 21% 
INADEQUATE INCENTIVES 
   Managing electricity use is not a priority 22% 
   The cost/inconvenience of responding outweighs the savings 22% 
RISK AVERSION/HEDGING 
   My organization’s management views these efforts as too risky 13% 
   Flat-rate or time-of-use contract makes responding unimportant 12% 
OTHER BARRIERS 3% 
NO BARRIERS ENCOUNTERED 12% 
DO NOT KNOW 3% 
a`Customers were asked to indicate all barriers that applied, so the responses do not add up to 100%. 
SC-3A price volatility was modest during the study period, particularly in the most recent 
years (see Figure 4). While there were instances of very high prices (in excess of $500/MWh), 
they were isolated to a few summer days and declined in frequency and severity in the later years 
of the study. Accordingly, about 22% of survey respondents cited inadequate incentives as an 
obstacle to price response. This may suggest latent capability that might be expressed under con-
ditions of greater price volatility, or that could be brought out with appropriate training and tech-
nology. 
Despite these reported obstacles, analysis of SC-3A customers’ billing records suggest 
that a sizeable number of them adjusted their usage when prices were high. We describe this re-
sponse next. 
 
Figure 4. Trends in SC-3A Prices 
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Note: Prices are shown for the Eastern region of NMPC service territory. Prices and price volatility in other NMPC 
regions were somewhat lower. 
 
Price Response Estimates 
 
We estimated price elasticities from customers’ metered electricity usage and the prices 
they faced during the five summers of the study (2000-2004). Customers were included in the 
analysis for all summers in which they paid SC-3A prices, or an indexed equivalent, for some or 
all of their usage. 119 of the 149 SC-3A customers met this criterion for at least one summer. 
 
Interpreting the Elasticity of Substitution 
 
The elasticity of substitution is used in this study to describe the price response of SC-3A 
customers, which are large industrial, commercial and institutional customers that use electricity 
as an input to producing intermediate or final goods or providing services to consumers or soci-
ety.8 This metric describes the extent to which a customer shifts usage that would normally occur 
                                                 
8 Like virtually all studies of large customer response to RTP, we estimated the substitution elasticity, 
rather than the own-price elasticity more often used for smaller customers, for two reasons. First, because large cus-
tomers are businesses (not consumers), it is theoretically consistent to portray their energy usage as a tradeoff in 
substitutable commodities (peak and off-peak electricity) that must be purchased in order to fulfill their business 
activities. Second, although the own-price elasticity has the advantage of providing a more direct measure of load 
reductions (in kW) than the substitution elasticity (which is a relative measure), calculating meaningful own-price 
estimates requires accounting for changes in business activity that might alter electricity usage independently of 
prices. For industrial customers, this might be approximated by production data (e.g., number of widgets produced). 
For service-oriented customers—the majority of our study population—defining a metric for business activity is 
more challenging. In either case, collecting this type of information from customers is infeasible, because it is both 
sensitive and onerous to collect.  
during the peak hours of the day to off-peak hours in response to a change in the ratio of peak 
and off-peak prices.9  
Mathematically, the elasticity of substitution is defined as the proportional change in 
peak to off-peak usage in response to a one-percent change in peak to off-peak prices. For exam-
ple, a customer with an elasticity of 0.15 should reduce peak-period electricity usage by 15% 
(relative to off-peak electricity) in response to a doubling of the price ratio (e.g., an increase in 
peak prices from 5 to 10¢/kWh, with off-peak prices held constant).10 The substitution elasticity 
is always positive. The higher the elasticity, the greater the observed load response. 
 
Aggregate Price Response 
 
The overall level of price response from SC-3A customers is modest, but encouraging: 
the load-weighted average elasticity of substitution is 0.11. This result is consistent with other 
studies of large customer price response (Boisvert et al 2004, Herriges et al 1993, Schwarz et al 
2002). 
Policymakers are particularly interested in the peak load reductions from RTP—the 
amount of DR they can expect at high prices. Estimated aggregate load response for the 119 cus-
tomers is shown in Figure 5. At peak prices five times higher than off-peak prices (the highest 
price ratio observed during the study period) this group of customers would be expected to cur-
tail their electricity usage by about 50 MW. This is about 10% of their combined summer peak 
demand.  
 
Figure 5. Aggregate Load Response of 119 SC-3A Customers 
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9 We defined the peak period empirically. Based on a preliminary analysis of customers’ usage data, the pe-
riod from 2pm to 5pm afforded the most distinct patterns in customer usage in response to prices. 
10 The substitution elasticity assumes that reductions in peak usage are made up kWh for kWh in off-peak 
periods (e.g., load shifting), yet many SC-3A customers told us they curtail load or switch to onsite generation. The 
substitution elasticity underestimates such customers’ peak period load response by ~5-10%. We have not attempted 
to correct for this. 
Response Varies by Business Sector 
 
We estimated load-weighted sector-average elasticities for each business sector. The 
manufacturing sector exhibited the highest elasticity, of 0.16. Government/education customers 
are also quite price-responsive (0.10)—an important finding given the common assumption that 
industrial customers are the best candidates for price response. The other sectors—
commercial/retail, health care and public works—are considerably less responsive, with average 
elasticities of 0.06, 0.04 and 0.02, respectively. 
  
Individual Customer Response 
 
While the sector-level results above show clear distinctions between different customer 
groups, they mask considerable variation in price responsiveness among customers within each 
group. About one-third of customers had zero elasticity estimates. This means that they used 
peak and off-peak electricity in fixed proportions, regardless of prices. For the other two-thirds 
of customers, with positive substitution elasticities, we observe some degree of price response; 
although there is wide variance in this capability (see Figure 6). Eighteen percent of the custom-
ers provide 75-80% of the aggregate demand response.  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Customers’ Price Responsiveness 
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Within business sectors, there is wide variation in price response (see Figure 7). This is 
most pronounced for manufacturing customers. Twenty-seven percent are highly price respon-
sive, with elasticities above 0.10. But 63% are essentially unresponsive (elasticities < 0.05), in-
cluding 27% with zero elasticities. The high average level of price response for this sector is 
provided by a few, very responsive customers. Within the government/education sector, price 
responsiveness is somewhat more evenly distributed.  
 
Figure 7. Price Responsiveness by Business Category 
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Influence of NYISO Emergency Programs 
 
While the need for improved DR is widely acknowledged, the relative roles and merits of 
pricing and incentive-based mechanisms for achieving it are the subject of considerable debate 
(Boisvert and Neenan 2003; Borenstein 2002; Ruff 2002). As already noted, 42% of NMPC’s 
SC-3A customers enrolled in NYISO’s emergency DR programs, which offer incentives to cur-
tail load when emergency events are declared. The experience of these customers, exposed to 
both RTP and DR programs, provides some insights into this issue. 
Empirical evidence shows that NYISO emergency programs enhance price response. 
EDRP participants had higher elasticities than non-participants, even though we explicitly ac-
counted for the incentive payment price in the demand model.11 This suggests that customers do 
not respond to EDRP events in the same way as to hourly prices, even when the financial incen-
tives are equivalent. 
In surveys and interviews, more customers told us they respond to NYISO program 
events (60%) than high hourly prices (5%). They cited multiple reasons for responding to NY-
ISO programs. While 63% reported responding to earn curtailment incentives, 59% told us they 
respond as part of a perceived civic duty to help keep the electric system secure. In such cases, 
responding is seen more as obligation to the community than an economic decision. In addition, 
30% noted the coincidence of NYISO emergency events and high hourly prices as a reason for 
responding to NYISO program events. As discussed above, most customers say they do not ac-
tively monitor SC-3A prices. For some, NYISO emergency events, which coincide with high 
prices, serve to alert them that electricity prices are high. 
Drawing from these results, we make the following observations. First, day-ahead RTP 
and emergency DR programs fulfill separate needs through distinct designs and attributes. Day-
ahead RTP involves routinely sending price signals to customers on a day-ahead basis (12-24 
hour timeframe). It promotes economic price response, in which customers are motivated by sav-
ings from curtailing usage when prices are high. This response provides system-wide benefits in 
                                                 
11 See Goldman et al (2005) for a discussion of the treatment of NYISO program incentives in the demand 
model. 
the form of lower wholesale market clearing prices. In contrast, NYISO emergency programs 
send signals on a contingency basis (two-hour timeframe) to promote emergency response, 
thereby providing system reliability benefits. 
There are also considerable synergies in implementing day-ahead RTP in conjunction 
with emergency programs. In interviews, we encountered customers who had developed re-
sponse strategies specifically to respond to NYISO programs which they subsequently adapted to 
respond to high SC-3A prices. The converse was also true for other customers. Thus, RTP can 
provide a training ground for customers to respond in emergency DR programs, and vice versa. 
We conclude that day-ahead RTP and emergency DR programs complement each other 
and should not be viewed as an “either-or” proposition. 
 
Price Response “Champions” 
 
While business type and NYISO emergency program participation are well correlated 
with price response, there is still substantial unexplained variation in individual SC-3A custom-
ers’ elasticities among these groups. We examined several other factors that could potentially 
drive price response, and found some correlations (e.g., onsite generation appears to be a driver 
for the most highly responsive customers) but none that were statistically significant. However, 
based on two years of interviewing and surveying SC-3A customers, we are convinced that an 
important, though difficult to measure, driver is the presence of a price-response “champion” 
within customer organizations. Champions are individuals willing to take the initiative to ad-
vance price response as a priority within their organization, often identifying creative ways to 
overcome obstacles to price or emergency program response that may transform company policy 
beyond their tenure. For example, we encountered individuals at public institutions who had 
taken initiatives to their governing agencies to permanently alter procurement rules, giving them 
more flexibility in managing energy costs. Others had simply taken the time to learn about their 
options in a changing environment and taken full advantage of available opportunities to control 
their energy costs. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The experience of NMPC’s SC-3A customers provides a unique source of information on 
how large customers adapt to default-service day-ahead market pricing in the context of retail 
competition over several years. The results provide evidence that default-service day-ahead RTP 
does promote everyday economic price response among large customers, even among many who 
have switched suppliers but still elect to face day-ahead market prices. However, while two-
thirds of customers exhibit some price response, about 20% account for 75-80% of the observed 
demand reductions. Differences in price response among customers are driven not only by busi-
ness sector, but are strongly influenced by participation in NYISO emergency DR programs, as 
well as other, less tangible factors such as the presence of price response “champions”. Policy-
makers need to recognize that not all large customers are alike, and most are currently not very 
price responsive. This is in part because they do not adopt fully automated DR strategies, even 
though many have installed the technologies necessary to do so. This suggests that there is a role 
for targeted technical assistance programs to help customers develop and implement more so-
phisticated price response strategies with the goal of improving overall DR potential.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work was supported by the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability of 
the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231 and coordinated by 
the Demand Response Research Center on behalf of the California Energy Commission Public 
Interest Energy Research program. This study would have been impossible without the assis-
tance and support of Michael Kelleher, Catherine McDonough and Art Hamlin of National Grid. 
 
References 
 
Boisvert, Richard, and Bernard Neenan. 2003. “Social Welfare Implications of Demand Re-
sponse Programs in Competitive Electricity Markets.” LBNL-52530. Berkeley, Calif.: Law-
rence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Boisvert, Richard, Peter Cappers, Bernie Neenan, and Bryan Scott. 2003. “Industrial and Com-
mercial Customer Response to Real Time Electricity Prices.” Available online: 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/drlm-pubs.html.  
Borenstein, Severin. 2002. “The Theory of Demand-Side Price Incentives.” In Dynamic Pricing, 
Advanced Metering and Demand Response in Electricity Markets. San Francisco, Calif.: 
Hewlitt Foundation Energy Series. 
Braithwait, Steven, and Michael O’Sheasy. 2001. “RTP Customer Demand Response – Empiri-
cal Evidence on How Much You Can Expect.” Chapter 12 in Electricity Pricing in Transi-
tion, A. Faruqui and K. Eakin, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Goldman, C., N. Hopper, O. Sezgen, M. Moezzi, R. Bharvirkar, B. Neenan, R. Boisvert, P. Cap-
pers, and D. Pratt. 2004a. “Customer Response to Day-ahead Wholesale Market Electricity 
Prices: Case Study of RTP Program Experience in New York.” Report to the California En-
ergy Commission. LBNL-54761. Berkeley, Calif.: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Goldman, C., N. Hopper, O. Sezgen, M. Moezzi, R. Bharvirkar, B. Neenan, D. Pratt, P. Cappers, 
and R. Boisvert. 2004b. “Does Real-Time Pricing Deliver Demand Response? A Case Study 
of Niagara Mohawk’s Large Customer RTP Tariff.” In Proceedings of the ACEEE 2004 
Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings, panel 5. 
Goldman, C., N. Hopper, R. Bharvirkar, B. Neenan, R. Boisvert, P. Cappers, D. Pratt, and K. 
Butkins. 2005. “Customer Strategies for Responding to Day-Ahead Market Hourly Electric-
ity Pricing.” Report to the California Energy Commission. LBNL-57128. Berkeley, Calif.: 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Herriges, J.A., S. M. Baladi, D. W. Caves, and B. F. Neenan. 1993. “The Response of Industrial 
Customers to Electric Rates Based Upon Dynamic Marginal Costs.” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 75 (20): 446-454. 
Piette, M. A., O. Sezgen, D. Watson, N. Motegi, C. Shockman, and L. ten Hope. 2005. “Devel-
opment and Evaluation of Fully Automated Demand Response in Large Facilities.” CEC-
500-2005-013. Sacramento, Calif.: California Energy Commission. 
Ruff, Larry. 2002. “Demand Response: Reality versus ‘Resource’.” The Electricity Journal 15 
(10): 10-23. 
Schwarz, P. M., T. N. Taylor, M. Birmingham, and S. L. Dardan. 2002. “Industrial Response to 
Electricity Real-Time Prices: Short Run and Long Run.” Economic Inquiry 40 (4): 597-610. 
Zarnikau, Jay. 1990. “Customer responsiveness to real-time pricing of electricity.” Energy Jour-
nal 11 (4): 99-116. 
